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ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TIMPANOGOS VILLAGE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DENNIS MCDONALD d/b/a MAC 
BUILDERS, 
Defendant-Appe1lant. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
(1) That the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment. 
(2) Should this court under principles of equity set 
aside the default judgment to relieve Defendant from an 
unjust judgment and allow Defendant to present a meritorious 
defense. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed its Complaint dated September 19, 1987, 
alleging negligent installation by the Defendant of a water line 
in property of the Plaintiff. The water line was installed by 
the Defendant pursuant to a remodeling contract entered into 
between the Defendant, DENNIS McDONALD, and Merrill Bateraan, 
owner of the Timpanogos Village Medical Associates Building 
located at 560 South State, Suite E-1, Orem, Utah. During the 
course of remodeling, a special request was made by Dr. Vest, 
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occupant of a suite in the Timpanogos Village Medical Associates 
Building, to install a one-quarter inch copper line from below a 
sink in a small half bath, up through a wall, through the ceiling 
and down into a office area, for the purpose of allowing an 
eventual hook-up of a refrigerator with an ice maker* The line 
was installed, but was not hooked up to a water source. (R. 11 & 
16) Defendant advised Dr. West and the owners of the building 
(Plaintiff) that before the water line was hooked up to a water 
source, additional insulation would need to be installed in the 
ceiling of the building to insulate the copper line from freezing 
during the winter months. (R. 16) Defendant was not required or 
requested to insulate the copper line. Defendant's work was 
completed and his remodeling contract discharged. Eventually the 
water line was connected to the water source by some person 
unknown to or unrelated to the Defendant or his business. (R. 
16). Due to freezing conditions over the winter months of 1986, 
the water line ruptured and caused water damage to the 
Plaintiff's building. (R. 16) Defendant was asked to repair the 
water damage and also participated in an investigation by Farm 
Bureau Insurance Exchange to determine the cause of the water 
damage. The cost of repairing the damage was paid by Farm Bureau 
Insurance Exchange. Approximately twenty (20) months later, 
Plaintiff, TIMPANOGOS VILLAGE, initiated the present action to 
recover from the Defendant the sum equal to the value of the 
damages to the building. Defendant, DENNIS McDONALD, did not 
answer the Complaint of the Plaintiff nor did the Defendant, 
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McDONALD, seek employment or services of counsel until after 
default judgment. Defendant called counsel for Plaintiff during 
the 20-day period before an answer was due, to find out what the 
suit was about. Defendant again communicated with Plaintiff's 
counsel on the day that default judgment was entered. Defendant 
had an extensive discussion with Plaintiff's counsel on the day 
default was entered and was not given to understand that a 
default judgment had been entered or would be, nor that he should 
take any further action to avoid judgment. Defendant's next 
notice of any action in the case was service upon him of a motion 
in supplemental proceedings. (R. 17) Defendant, McDONALD, is 
not trained in the law, has not required the services of counsel 
in the past for any purpose, and is not schooled in the rules of 
civil procedure. (R. 17) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based upon principles of law and equity which have been set 
forth by the Utah Appellate Courts, it is apparent that the trial 
judge in this matter abused his discretion in failing to set 
aside a default judgment entered against Defendant, DENNIS 
McDONALD. Plaintiff, TIMPANOGOS VILLAGE, is not the real party 
in interest and Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest. Plaintiff, TIMPANOGOS VILLAGE, was paid 
once by Farm Bureau Insurance Exchange for the damages claimed to 
have been caused by a ruptured water line. Plaintiff, TIMPANOGOS 
VILLAGE, should not be allowed to collect again or receive 
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judgment for damages already once claimed and paid* 
Default was entered October 23, 1987, and default judgment 
was entered October 27, 1987. (R. 5 & 6) Defendant's Motion to 
Set Aside Default Judgment was filed December 10, 1987. (R. 10) 
The Court's Minute Entry denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment was made January 19, 1988. (R. 30) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has set forth the principles of 
equity and law pertaining to setting aside default judgments 
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in the case 
of Katz vs. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1988). In that case the 
court stated: 
The District Court Judge is vested with considerable 
discretion under Rule 60(b) in granting or denying a 
motion to set aside a judgment....(cases cited)...The 
court should be generally indulgent toward setting a 
judgment aside where there is reasonable justification 
or excuse for the defendant's failure to answer and 
when timely application is made. Where there is doubt 
about whether a default should be set aside, that doubt 
should be resolved in favor of doing so. 
The principles announced in Katz were applied in a prior 
Supreme Court case titled May vs. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109 (Utah 
1984). In the May case, the plaintiff served a summons on the 
defendant and filed the Complaint with the clerk of the court on 
the 10th day after service of the Summons but did not deposit a 
copy of the Complaint with the clerk. There was irregularity 
concerning service of the Summons and Complaint on the defendant, 
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and there was evidence that the defendant did not have counsel 
until after judgment. His sole advisor prior to judgment was the 
insurance adjuster who had negotiated for settlement with the 
plaintiff. After default was entered against the defendant, he 
employed legal counsel and timely filed a motion to vacate the 
default judgment. The defendant was 18 years old. The court 
found that the technical procedure incident to the case, the 
contradictions engendered in the service of process, inconsistent 
returns, failure to deposit a copy of the Complaint with the 
clerk of court, the controverted mailing of a copy of the 
Complaint, efforts to reach a pre-litigation settlement, the 
immediacy in seeking relief from default, and defendant's 
reliance on guidance by the insurance adjuster, all suggested 
justice in granting relief from a default. The court reaching a 
conclusion to set aside the default judgment stated: 
We are not unmindful of the principle of reserving 
determination of a motion to vacate to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. On appeal, we should 
not reverse the trial court's determination unless it 
is arbitrary, capricious or not based on adequate 
findings of fact or on the law. We are aware also of a 
principle that if default is issued when a party 
genuinely is mistaken to a point where, absent such 
mistake, default would not have occurred, the equity 
side of the court would grant relief. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Helgesen vs. 
Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1981) set aside a default 
judgment against the defendant in a case with facts similar to 
the case at hand. In the Helgesen case, plaintiff was injured in 
rear-end collisions occurring October 12, 1978, and April 15, 
1979, respectively. Plaintiff's counsel had negotiated with 
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defendant's insurance adjuster for approximately five months. 
Settlement was not reached and counsel for the plaintiff sent 
copies of the Complaints he had prepared to the insurance 
adjuster on November 12, 1979, with a letter advising the 
adjuster that settlement would remain open for the 20-day period 
for answering the respective Complaints. Defendant was served 
with Summons November 24, 1979, and did not answer the Complaint. 
Judgement by default was entered against the defendant and on 
January 3, 1980, notice of the entry of the judgment was sent to 
the defendant. On January 11, 1980, a Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment was filed. The Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment was denied. The Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
was supported by an affidavit of the insurance adjuster who 
stated that he had the erroneous belief that he had additional 
time to answer the Complaint based upon his understanding that 
plaintiff's counsel would send additional medical information to 
the adjuster so he could properly evaluate the claim. Additional 
medical information was not sent. Also, the adjuster declared in 
his affidavit that he believed, through a conversation with 
plaintiff's counsel, that there would be an extension of time to 
file the answer. The Utah Supreme Court set aside the default 
judgment and stated in its opinion the following: 
...It is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of 
discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where 
there is reasonable justification or excuse for the 
defendant's failure to appear, and timely application 
is made to set it aside. 
Helgesen's counsel argued that since Allstate was in the 
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insurance business and experienced in litigation, its adjuster 
was unexcusably negligent in the handling of the Complaint. 
Responding to this argument, the court stated: 
The plaintiff's attorney and Allstate's adjuster had 
been in frequent contact with each other for five 
months negotiating settlement of the two claims. The 
attorney was well aware that the adjuster and his 
company contested the amount sought by the plaintiff. 
With that knowledge, he must have expected that when he 
filed the law suits, the insurance company would defend 
them.... It is not uncommon in the practice of the law 
that when parties are negotiating settlement and one 
party files a law suit to bring pressure to bear, the 
other party is not strictly held to the time 
requirements of the rules of procedure since settlement 
talk continues to the day of trial and few days delay 
has little or no affect on when the trial date will be 
set....Under the circumstances the adjuster had every 
reason to believe that he would be extended 
professional courtesy by the attorney with whom he was 
dealing and would hear back from him with further 
medical information. He was reasonable in believing 
that no default judgment would be taken in the 
meantime. We therefore conclude he was not guilty of 
lack of diligence and the defendant should be relieved 
of his default under Rule 60(b) on account of the 
mistake and excusable neglect of the adjuster. 
In the instant case, default judgment was taken against 
Defendant, DENNIS McDONALD, on about October 27, 1987. No notice 
of the default was given to the Defendant. However, on 
December 3, 1987, Defendant's wife was served with a Motion for 
and Order in Supplemental Proceedings. Defendant then filed his 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on December 10, 1987. In 
his affidavit supporting the Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment, Defendant stated that he had contact with Plaintiff's 
counsel on two occasions. One occasion was prior to entry of 
default judgment and the other occasion was on the day of entry 
of default judgment. Defendant asserts in his affidavit that he 
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was not advised that default judgment was entered nor that it 
would be. He was not advised that he should take any action and 
he did not seek advice of counsel. Defendant further asserts 
that he had been instrumental in assisting in the investigation 
of the cause of damage to Plaintiff1s building and had consulted 
with agents of Farm Bureau Insurance Exchange to determine the 
cause of the damage. (R. 16) He was aware that a claim by the 
Plaintiff for the cost of the damage had been paid by Farm Bureau 
Insurance Exchange. (R. 16) Defendant further asserts that he 
had contact with Mr. Bateman, owner of TIMPANOGOS VILLAGE, and 
with agents of Farm Bureau Insurance Exchange after service of 
the Complaint and Summons upon him. It is reasonable to conclude 
from the facts and circumstances surrounding Defendantfs receipt 
of a copy of the Complaint and Summons and his actions taken 
thereafter that he reasonably believed that he was involved in 
on-going negotiations or investigation pertaining to the claim of 
the Complaint, and that he did not realize that he should take 
any action such as answer the Complaint himself or seek advice of 
counsel. The facts of this case are very similar to the facts of 
the May and Helgesen cases where the Utah Supreme Court set aside 
default judgments. 
Defendant has further asserted that he has a meritorious 
defense to the Plaintiff1s cause of action. He has asserted in 
his Affidavit in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
that he was not the party who connected the copper line to a 
water source which eventually ruptured when frozen. Defendant 
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has asserted in his affidavit that he simply installed the line 
and advised Plaintiff and Plaintiff's tenant that the line would 
later need to be connected and insulated to avoid breakage. (R. 
16) 
Defendant further has asserted in his affidavit that 
Plaintiff, TIMPANOGOS VILLAGE, was paid by Farm Bureau Insurance 
Exchange for the damage caused by the ruptured water line. The 
pleadings on file do not indicate that TIMPANOGOS VILLAGE has 
received an assignment from Farm Bureau Insurance Exchange to 
assert claims which Farm Bureau Insurance Exchange may have to be 
reimbursed for the amount expended by them to pay the water 
damage claim. Thus, Defendant has effectively raised the issue 
of whether or not Plaintiff is the real party in interest. 
The trial judge seems to have ignored the important 
considerations of law and equity which were raised in Defendant's 
motion and affidavit. The trial judge simply entered a decision 
denying the motion of the Defendant to set aside the default 
judgment without giving any reason or reasons therefor. 
Defendant respectfully contends that under the facts and 
circumstances of this case, that his neglect to answer the 
Complaint was reasonable and excusable and that he does have a 
meritorious defense to the Complaint of the Plaintiff. Defendant 
respectfully requests this Court to set aside the default 
judgment and allow him to answer the Complaint. 
9 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE AGAINST THE CLAIMS 
OF THE PLAINTIFF, AND THIS COURT UNDER EQUITABLE 
PRINCIPLES SHOULD RELIEVE DEFENDANT FROM AN UNJUST JUDGMENT 
(a) PLAINTIFF, TIMPANOGOS VILLAGE, IS NOT THE REAL 
PARTY IN INTEREST 
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest....No action shall be dismissed 
on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest until a reasonable time has 
been allowed after objection or ratification of 
commencement of the action by, or joinder or 
substitution of, the real party in interest;... 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Kemp vs. Murray, 680 
P.2d 758 (Utah 1984) set forth the purpose and protection 
afforded by Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Citing an earlier case, Shaw vs. Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745 (1952), 
the Supreme Court in Kemp stated: 
The reason the defendant has the right to have a cause 
of action prosecuted by the real party in interest is 
so that the judgment will preclude any action on the 
same demand by another and permit the defendant to 
assert all defenses or counterclaims available against 
the real owner of the cause. 
In his affidavit supporting the Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment, the Defendant, DENNIS McDONALD, stated that he 
participated in an investigation with Farm Bureau Insurance 
Exchange to determine the cause of water damage to Plaintiff's 
building. He further stated that he was aware that the claim was 
eventually settled and paid to the Plaintiff by Farm Bureau 
Insurance Exchange. The Defendant, himself, was the recipient of 
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payment made by Farm Bureau Insurance Exchange since Defendant 
had done the repair work necessitated by the water damage. The 
facts stated in the Defendant's affidavit are not controverted by 
the Plaintiff in his response to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment. (R. 19-27) Plaintiff has not alleged in its 
Complaint that it is an assignee of the cause of action of Farm 
Bureau Insurance Exchange. Obviously if Plaintiff has been 
reimbursed for the damage caused to its building by water damage, 
then it is inequitable and unconscionable for Plaintiff to be 
awarded judgment for the same claim. The real party in interest 
appears to be Farm Bureau Insurance Exchange but same is not 
named as a party plaintiff. However, Farm Bureau Insurance 
Exchange could presently bring an action on its own claim 
(subrogation) against the Defendant, DENNIS McDONALD. Allowing 
separate claims by the Plaintiff herein and Farm Bureau Insurance 
Exchange would bring a result intolerable in the law. Thus, the 
default judgment should be set aside and the Plaintiff should be 
required to amend its Complaint to set forth the real party in 
interest or to allege an assignment from Farm Bureau Insurance 
Exchange. 
(b) PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PROHIBITED FROM COLLECTING 
TWICE FOR A SINGLE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 
Defendant has asserted in his affidavit supporting his 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment that he installed a water 
line at the request of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff's tenant, 
Dr. West. (R. 16) Defendant further asserted in his affidavit 
that he did not connect the water line to a water source and that 
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there was inadequate insulation in the attic of the building 
where the water line was exposed to protect the line from 
freezing in the winter. Defendant further asserted that at some 
time after the installation of the water line, it was connected 
to a water source and apparently done so without adequately 
insulating the line as it passed through the ceiling. Defendant 
further has asserted that due to winter cold, which apparently 
penetrated the attic of the Plaintiff's building, that the water 
in the line froze and caused the line to burst in the attic area 
resulting in damage to the premises. If the assertions of the 
Defendant are proven at trial, then the trier of fact would 
likely conclude that the Defendant is not liable to the 
Plaintiff. The Plaintiff would likely discover that a separate 
party is or ought to be liable for the water damage. 
Conceivably, the trier of fact could find that the Plaintiff's 
own negligence in failing to insulate the water line when it was 
connected to a water source or prior thereto is the sole or major 
contributing cause of the ruptured line and consequent water 
damage. Defendant contends that based upon principles of equity 
herein discussed, that he has presented and does present a 
meritorious defense, and that when coupled with his reasonable 
and excusable neglect, the judgment should be set aside, the 
Defendant allowed to answer and assert his defenses including a 
motion to determine the real party in interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to reasonable and excusable neglect, Defendant, DENNIS 
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McDONALD, failed to answer the Complaint of the Plaintiff. 
Default Judgment was entered October 27, 1987, and Defendant 
filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment December 10, 1987. 
Defendant took timely action to pursue setting aside the Default 
Judgment. The Defendant's participation in investigation of 
damage caused to Plaintiff's building, the Defendant's personal 
knowledge that the claim for the damage had been paid by an 
insurance company, and the Defendant's conversations with 
counsel, Merrill Bateman and agents of the insurance company, 
which caused him to believe that no adverse consequence would 
result from his failure to act, give rise to circumstances very 
similar to the circumstances and facts in the May and Helgesen 
cases. In May and Helgesen, the Supreme Court found a basis in 
law and equity to set aside a default judgment. 
The Defendant successfully raised in the Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment issues pertaining to whether or not the 
Plaintiff was the real party in interest. Defendant has 
successfully demonstrated that he has a meritorious defense to 
the claims of the Plaintiff. His defenses include the following 
possibilities: Defendant, DENNIS McDONALD, is not liable to the 
Plaintiff; the negligence of a third party caused the damage; 
Plaintiff's own negligence is the major contributing factor to 
the damage. Based upon the foregoing, Defendant contends that 
the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. Defendant respectfully 
requests that this Court enter an order remanding this case and 
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directing the court to set aside the default judgment and allow 
the Defendant to file his answer and other pleadings in the case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^A^-day of June, 1988. 
Attorrfey/fpr Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and exact copy of 
the foregoing instrument to Mr. Taylor D. Carr, Attorney for 
Plaintiff, at 350 South 400 East, Suite 114, Salt Lake City, UT 
84111 this r ? day of June, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM 
TAYLOR D. CARR 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
350 South 400 East, Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
TIMPANOGAS VILLAGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNIS McDONALD dba MAC BUILDERS 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff above named complains of defendant and for 
cause of action alleges: 
1. The amount in controvery is less than $10,000.0Cr 
and the damage complained of occurred in Utah County, State 
of Utah. 
2. Prior to the 9th day of February, 1986, Defendant 
caused to be installed in or near the attic of plaintiff's 
commercial building located at 560 South State, Orem, Utah, a 
certain copper water line. 
3. Defendant in performing the duties of installation 
of said water line, did so in a negligent and unworkmanlike 
manner such that on or about the 9th day of February, 1986, 
said water line froze and burst causing damage to Plaintiff's 
building. 
4. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
i 
negligent, careless and unworkmanlike conduct on the part of 
Defendant, Plaintiff was damaged in the sum of $4,029.46. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant 
in the sum of $4,029.46 together with costs incurred herein 
and such other and further relief as the Court deems just in 
the premises. 
DATED this f\ day of September, 19§^ 
&M^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
& 
TAYLOR D. CARR - A0582 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
350 South 400 East, Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
TIMPANOGAS VILLAGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. I 
DENNIS MCDONALD dba MAC I 
BUILDERS . { 
Defendant. I 
DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT 
[ Civil No. 873002481W 
* "* 
DEFAULT 
In this action, Defendant above named having been reg-
ularly served with Summons and Complaint, and having failed 
to appear and answer Plaintiff's Complaint, and the time al-
lowed by law for answering having expired, the default of 
said Defendent is hereby entered according to law. 
DATED this S?3 day of , 1987. 
CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
BY ^TL^^/jM^ 
Deputy Clerk 
t FILED IN 
faiJVO CITY COtiul 
UTiJI CnUNTr.UTiJM 
OCT 23 !! 03 AH *y? 
PH'TvO CITY CLERK 
V 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
The Defendant above named has failed to plead or other-
wise defend in this action and default has been entered, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff above named be awarded 
JUDGMENT against the Defendant in the sum of: 
$4029.46 Principal, 
33.57 Accrued interest to date of Judgment, 
57.50 Accrued costs to date of Judgment, 
.00 Attorney's fees, 
$4120.53 TOTAL JUDGMENT. 
With interest on the total judgment at the rate of twelve 
per cent (12%) per annum as provided by law from the date 
of this judgment until paid. . 
DATED and SIGNED this ^ssJ J day of /Ptf 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
RCUft£ COURT ,JUD$E -OR 
4ERIC or-THE GO&& 
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T ^ r - « e r s *">~"twryitt 
GARY H. WEIGHT (3415) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for P la in t i f f 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 373-4912 
IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
TIMPANOGOS VILLAGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNIS MCDONALD d/b/a MAC 
BUILDERS, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Case No. 873002481CV 
COMES NOW, t h e D e f e n d a n t , DENNIS McDONALD d / b / a MAC 
BUILDERS, by and through c o u n s e l , Gary H. Weight of Aldr ich , 
Nelson, Weight & Esp l in , and moves the Court pursuant t o Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civ i l Procedure to set aside that 
certain judgment entered against the Defendant on October 27, 
1987. Said motion i s made upon the grounds and for the reasons 
set forth in sub-paragraph 1, 3 and 7 of Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of C iv i l Procedure. This motion i s f i led not more than 
three (3) months after entry of judgment and i s based upon the 
following facts which are set forth here and are support by the 
Affidavit of the Defendant attached hereto and made a part hereof 
by t h i s reference. 
. • • • ' < £ • • 
-,*r**t— -"Z. '••' -* .-*'\ 
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Defendant, DENNIS McDONALD, was hired in May of 1983 to 
remodel office space for a Merrill Bateman, owner of Timpanogos 
Village Medical Associates located at 560 South State, Suite .E-1, 
Orem, Utah. Defendant remodeled a suite which was occupied by 
Dr. West. During the remodel, Defendant was requested to install 
a one-quarter inch copper line from below a sink in a small half 
bath over to an office area so that a refrigerator with an ice 
maker could be hooked up eventually. The copper line was not 
connected to a water source and the tenant or owner of the office 
was advised that before a connection of the copper wire was 
recommended, additional insulation should be blown into the 
ceiling of the office building. Eventually, someone other than 
the Defendant connected the copper line and over the winter it 
froze and burst and caused water damage which was repaired by 
Defendant and paid for by Farm Bureau Insurance, the subrogee in 
this case. Farm Bureau Insurance Investigated the claim 
thoroughly and elected to make a payment for the damages. Now 
one year and nine months later, Farm Bureau as subrogee or 
TIMPANOGOS VILLAGE have brought this action in negligence and 
unworkmanlike conduct. Defendant was served with a Summons on 
September 28, 1987, and made contact with Plaintiff's attorney 
and discussed the facts of the case at length with Plaintiff's 
attorney. Plaintiff's counsel did not advise the Defendant that 
he was about to take a judgment or that the Defendant would need 
* - ? •\^:.c^>-
' 4>:" 
to take any further action* Defendant was not contacted by 
Pla int i f f 1 s counsel or by P l a i n t i f f nor did Defendant have any 
further contact with the case unti l he was served with the motion 
in supplemental proceedings* 
Based upon the foregoing f a c t s , Defendant believes he has a 
meritorious defense to the case and does not interpose t h i s 
motion for delay, but d e s i r e s to have his day in court and 
bel ieves that his motion i s well founded and that the Judgment 
should be set aside and the Defendant allowed to f i l e his answer 
and have the matter set down for t r i a l . Defendant respectfully 
moves the Court to grant his motion. 
DATED th is Jg&4ay of December, 1987-
7/^1^-
Ttmr 
for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of 
the foregoing instrument to Mr. Taylor D. Carr, Attorney for 
Plaintiff, at 350 South 400 East, Suite 114, Salt Lake City, UT 
84111 this //)** day of December, 1987. 
GARY H. WEIGHT (3415) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
A t t o r n e y s for P l a i n t i f f 
.43 E a s t 200 North 
P . O . Box "L" 
P r o v o , UT 84603 
T e l e p h o n e : 373-4912 
IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
TIMPANOGOS VILLAGE, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
- v s -
DENNIS MCDONALD d/b/a MAC 
BUILDERS, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Case No. 873002481CV 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, DENNIS McDONALD, being first duly sworn upon my oath 
depose and say: 
1. That I am the Defendant in the above-entitled case. 
2. That I do business under the name of MAC BUILDERS AND 
REMODELING. 
3. That in May of 1983 I was hired by Merrill Bateman, 
owner of the Timpanogos Village Medical Associates building locate 
at 560 South State, Suite E-l, Orem, Utah, and Bernard Tanner, 
representative for Dr. West, to remodel the above mentioned suite. 
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4. I was requested to remodel a suite for a Dr. West. In 
the process of remodeling the suite I was requested to install a 
one-quarter inch copper line from below a sink in a small half bath 
up through a wall through the ceiling and down into an office area 
for the purpose of allowing an eventual hookup of a refrigerator 
with an ice maker. The line was installed in the wall and overhead 
in the attic and down into the office as requested. The water line 
was not connected to a water source. 
5. I advised the tenant that before the water line was used 
that additional insulation would need to be installed in the ceilin 
of the building or there would be a risk of water freezing in the 
line over the winter months* I advised the owner that the building 
needed additional insulation. 
6. Eventually the water line was connected by some other 
person unknown to me and due to freezing over the winter months, 
the line ruptured and caused water damage in the building. I was 
requested to repair the area and I did so by reinstalling sheetrock, 
floor coverings and painting the walls. 
7. I spoke with adjusters from Farm Bureau Insurance Company 
who fully investigated into the matter and examined all the facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the claim made by TIMPANOGOS VILLAGE 
The claim was paid by Farm Bureau Insurance. The claim was paid and 
the matter resolved approximately one year and nine months ago. 
8. I was served with process in the within action whereupon 
c - : . • . : , ; &• 
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3 I s u i t had been i n i t i a t e d . I ca l l ed Mr. Carr during the twenty day 
4 J period t o f ind out what t h i s act ion was and did not communicate wi 
5 J him again u n t i l the day the judgment was f i l e d . I discussed the 
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case at length with Mr. Carr, counsel for the plaintiff, the day t] 
judgment was filed. I did not understand that a judgment would be 
entered against me, nor that I should take action to avoid judgmeni 
I received no other communication with plaintiff, Farm Bureau or 
Taylor Carr until such time as I was served with a motion for an 
order in supplemental proceedings. 
9. I am not trained in the law nor have I ever been involve 
in litigation. I have not been required to use the services of 
counsel in any of my past business dealings or personal matters. 
Thus, I am not schooled in the rules of civil procedure, nor had I 
been aware of the requirements of law with respect to filing answer 
to complaints. I believed that I had fully responded to and addres 
the complaint of the plaintiff when I personally spoke with repre-
sentatives of the plaintiff, attorney for the plaintiff, and Farm 
Bureau Insurance agents. 
Further, affiant saith naught. 
DATED this //-fA day of December, 1987. 
ti^SlSUb T0^°I^^ 
DENNIS MCDONALD" 
Defendant. 
-3-
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3 I SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ///^  day of 
4 December, 1987. 
Xv-^Jfuju w. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Comm. expires: 4/9/90 Residing at PI. Grove, Utah 
9 MAILING CERTIFICATE 
10 | I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of 
the foregoing instrument to Mr. Taylor D. Carr, Attorney for 
11 || Plaintiff, at 350 South 400 East, Suite 114, Salt Lake City, UT 
84111, this //i* day of December, 1987. 
12 " 
13 CL Hui^Jk 
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REVIVED 0£C J 7 887 
TAYLOR D. CARR - A0582 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
350 South 400 East, Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 363-0888 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
TIMPANOGAS VILLAGE, 
Plaintiff, 
V S . i 
DENNIS MCDONALD dba MAC i 
BUILDERS, i 
Defendant. i 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 873002481W 
Plaintiff hereby sets forth the following Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in response to defendant's Motion 
to set aside the Default Judgment in this matter. 
FACTS 
1. The defendant, Dennis McDonald dba Mac Builders, 
was personally served with a Summons and Complaint in this 
matter on September 19, 1987. (Record on file). 
2. The defendant did not respond to said Summons and 
Complaint and a Judgment was taken on or about October 27, 
1987, thirty eight (38) days after personal service was 
effected. (Record on file). 
3. After said Judgment had already been taken the defen-
dant called plaintiff's counsel concerning the Judgment and 
at that time stated that he was aware that he had been served 
but had forgotten about the matter because he v/as busy with 
1 
. & 
o t h e ^ b u s i n e s s m a t t e r s . ( A f f i d a v i t of '["ay 1 or I!111, jinn ri I 1 a c lied 
ARGUMENT 
lllii I|H f iTirlrinl Sf'tf-, iiii I In mi I PIII|I 111 i • .1 (i f I'iieiif nf I IN l<irt,-. 
of t h i s c a s e In o r d e r t o show t h a t he has <\ m e r i t o r i o u s 
d e f e n s e , however, i t i s c l e a r p u r s u a n t t o Rul e 60 (b ) U . K . C 
I I ri | i()JI 11 ,i 1 I r .vt^e ILirt, llliiil I In.; d e f e n d a n t must show c a u s e 
wli> t h e De fau l t shou ld be s e t a s i d e b e f o r e • * d e f e n d a n t 
shows t h a t h<j has a IIICI i l m m i h def^ii; >. 
II' lias l">een c l e a r l y h e l d thai : b e f o r e t h e Cour t can d e -
c i d e whe the r t he defendant- h a s a m e r i t o r i o u s d e f e n s e t h e T r ' i a l 
ve< I Lr .piHVil ion D1 e x c u s a b l e ne^ie«..t . S t a t e 
Depar tmen t of S o c i a l S e r v i c e s v s . Musslman, 667 p . ',:d 1 053 
(1983 U t a h ) . 
The d e f e n d a n t r e l i e s upon s u b * p a r a g r a p h s 1 , 3 and 7 of 
Rule 80 (b ) ll l ! H r ,P , in s u p p o r t of h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h i s 
I »o I an I („ sl'M HI Jil d ' i j i IIL-JJ |l .ib i d e . 
Ru le 60(b)-1 • -oncerns f raud or m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ;~ 
o t h e r m i s c o n d u c t <_ I t h e pari; of ! he .''id' f ^ r s * 1 \ 
c l e a r . <*uppor'* • by any t a c t s in t i n s c a - e . ana u v j ~ 
fort- » , « .- r e s p o n d e d t o . 
R u l - ~ I I.II i1"1! i i.lqinen* ' « I)e set , i s i d e up .ui 
a showing f o<ia<e; inadvertance, surprise or excusable 
neglec*- , There * - * lengthy amount of case J aw as to wi 
c s 11 :li s c l e a r t h ? 
2 
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the defendant cannot show any of these elements. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held for instance that illness alone is 
not sufficient to make neglect in defending one's action 
excusable. Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Company, 260 p. 2d 741 . 
The Court has further stated even in a case where the 
plaintiff's attorney made an oral promise that the defendant 
could have more time to answer where the Default had already 
been entered that the Default would not be set aside because 
such was not sufficient excusable neglect so as to allow the 
vacation of the Default Judgment. Warren vs. Dixon Ranch 
Company, 260 p. 2d 741. 
The defendant in this case has admitted that he received 
personal service of the Summons and Complaint but that he 
did not think he had to do anything about it. Although 
nowhere in his Affidavit does defendant say he was advised 
he did not have to file an answer. On the contrary, the ev-
idence is that plaintiff always intended to pursue its claim 
and defendant knew this. (Affidavit of Taylor D. Carr with 
attachments). This is clearly not a sufficient standard to 
rise to the requirments of excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(1) where the Court has repeatedly held that more than 
just forgetfulness, illness, business matters, or a feeling 
that nothing need be done must be shown in order to provide 
the excusable neglect required pursuant to that Rule. 
The defendant also relies on Rule 60(b)(7), however, 
3 
t h a t - * rained it* . « >n i m. • dSt i? i 
** L?££L?„te School D i s t r i c t v s . ' x ^ i ^ , ^ T t L;,t. 
,* . endant' -> * c 
• thought the Summons was i n v a l i d and t h e r e f o r e p a id r- -tf 
f u s e d I 11 S f I ii i'i i i l e f I H J I l e f t UP • < 
i ^ h a t D d > ; - . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above ci ted facts, the attached Affi davit 
d*--. i the .aw cited herein plaintiff respectfully requests that 
* . • i i e i ly defer idai it' ' => I" h :)t :i • : 1 t : e Del:a" ill t 
in this matter, 
DATED and SIGNED this 15th day of .ueceffib*^ :', 1987. 
/ 
TAYLOR D. CARR 
Attorney for plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
1 hereby certify that I caused a tr ue ai id correct copy 
of the above and foregoing document to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, this 15th day of 'December, 1987', to: 
Gary H. Weight 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 1 
BARBARA" PARRY /£ 
Secretary 
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RECEIVED DEC 1 7 1987 
TAYLOR D. CARR - A0582 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
350 South 400 East, Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 363-0888 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
TIMPANOGAS VILLAGE, ! 
Plaintiff, 
vs. I 
DENNIS MCDONALD dba MAC i 
BUILDERS, I 
Defendant. i 
AFFIDAVIT 
TAYLOR D. 
Civil No. 
OF 
CARR 
873002481CV 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Your affiant, Taylor D. Carr, upon being duly sworn, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. He is attorney for Plaintiff in the above entitled 
matter and is personally familiar with the facts set forth 
herein below. 
2. Contrary to defendant's Affidavit this matter was 
not resolved one year and nine months ago. Defendant was 
put on notice May 16, 1986 and again on September 3, 1986, 
that he was expected to pay or legal proceedings would be 
initiated. (Two letters from Utah Farm Bureau attached). 
3. On or about September 19, 1987 your affiant caused 
to be served through a constable in Utah County, a Summons 
and Complaint which was personally served upon the defendant 
herein. 
( , c 
Contrary to tl i<= tatement made by <lpfpiidainil" „ intend 
d your ..- \ i ai it unti II a f t e r tl le De fau l t was 
e n t e r e d . However, a c c e p t i n g defendant' - - s t a t e m e n t t h a t such 
c o n t a c t was inside , SHI>SIM M HI He! endant il does he 
say he was a d v i s e d he d id not have t o r : .. a n s w e r , 
^, Approximately t h i r t y p n i h t H-M I day i l t^r - • 
c f p r o c e s s you r a f f i a i 11 ca us ed i o be e n t e r e d a De fa u11 adgmen t 
for J ack of r e s p o n s e t o sa id Summons and Complaint from 
d e f e n d a n t . 
6, After the time said Default was entered your affiant 
had a personal telephone conversation Willi M m dH andan f in 
tl ns mallei wh^ rr? in I In-' defendant stated that a-- knew he had 
been served and that he had forgotten about * -^ -natter because 
of other bus iness affairs IMI! ff"-fi M h< I nisi t^membered jb< si 
the case until after the Default had been entered. 
DATED and SIGNED this 15th day of December, 19R7 
4v 
<k u *•* 
---TAXhCfo D. CARR 
Attorney for Pla;: • ' ' 
NOTARY CLAUSE 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to mc 
9 8 7
 • ^ — ^ ^ 
/ f e ^ 
I BAHBAPA K„ «\*,SRY 
^U. 
If) da> it December, 
M y Commi'Sa-JLojdLjiJC'|li re s : 
A? -^f^/ 
^K Cfojfo** ^.VJA NOTARY PUBLIC 
p 
Residing i , A i ^ 4 ( ^ , 
*°>'' >r-a/ 
& . . Q 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing document, postage prepaid this 
15th day of December, 1987, to: 
Gary H. Weight 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603 
BARBARA PARRY J 
Secretary 
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RECEIVED JAN 2 5 m 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
TIMPANOGOS VILLAGE 
-vs-
Plaintiff, 
DENNIS MCDONALD dbd W\C 
BUILDERS 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Dated January 19, 1988 
Case No. 873002481 CV 
Judge Joseph Dimick 
A f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g Defendant' 1, Mot. i on In • i *-» t Aiiidn Defaull luili.iitit.-int, 
the same is hereby denied. 
e Joseph Dimick 
Mailed copy to: 
Taylor D. Carr, 350 S. 400 E., Suite 114, SLC, UT 84111 
Gary H. Weight, P.O. Box "L", Provo, UT 84603 
Mailed by: Judy Talbot 
